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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Troy Lamar Harrell appeals from the judgment and sentence entered
upon his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
While on felony probation for a prior burglary conviction, Harrell sold
synthetic cannabis - advertised as "potpourri" - to an undercover police officer.
(PSI, pp.2-3, 5, 8, 16-17; Bates Stamped Attachments to PSI, pp.1, 4-5, 7, 2526.)

He was charged by superceding indictment with delivery of a controlled

substance. (R., pp.15-16.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Harrell pied guilty to
the charge and the state dismissed additional controlled substance charges in a
separate case. (R., pp.120-33; 2/13/13 Tr., p.4, L.6 - p.25, L.22.) Also pursuant
to the agreement, the state was free to argue "the facts and criminal history as
contained in the presentence investigation" but agreed to submit on the
presentence investigator's recommendation as to the actual sentence to be
imposed. (2/13/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-13; PSI, p.8.)
In the presentence report, Harrell professed to have been unaware he
was "committing a felony" by selling "Potpourri to the officer." (PSI, p.5.)

In

response, the prosecutor argued at sentencing that the facts and circumstances
of the crime refuted Harrell's claims of ignorance. (3/25/13 Tr., p.15, L.17 - p.16,
L.10.) Specifically, the prosecutor pointed out that Harrell and his wife sold the
"potpourri" out of a store called "Smoke Effecx," and that "[w]hen you got to
Smoke Effecx, there were marijuana posters and banners all over the place," as
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well as "T-shirts with drug paraphernalia and marijuana slogans all over them,"
and "marijuana leaf-shaped ashtrays on the counter." (3/25/13 Tr., p.15, L.19 p.16, L.2.) The prosecutor further represented: "[T]hey sold spice. They sold
drugs. They sold pipes. They were in the business of getting money, lots of
money - approximately 25 to 29,000 was seized from them - by selling people
... spice."

(3/25/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.4-10; see also p.17, Ls.5-6 (prosecutor

representing potpourri was "sold right next to the smoking pipes").)

Defense

counsel did not object to the prosecutor's factual representations, but he did
respond to them in his own argument, stating: "While some of the things [the
prosecutor] does bring up are factually correct, . . . . [f]or [sic] the best of my
knowledge,

there weren't any pipes that were sold

in this

particular

establishment." (3/25/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.17-25.) Defense counsel's recollection of
the facts is substantiated by the police reports attached to the presentence
report, which indicate the only items for sale inside Smoke Effecx were several
different brands of "potpourri." (Bates Stamped Attachments to PSI, pp.1, 5, 7.)
After considering the contents of the presentence report, including the
attachments thereto (3/25/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-16, p.29, Ls.21-23, p.30, Ls.4-8),
and listening to the arguments of counsel and Harrell's own statement in
allocution (3/25/13 Tr., p.14, L.12 - p.28, L.24, p.29, L.21 - p.30, L.3), the district
court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed (R., pp.15455; 3/25/13 Tr., p.35, Ls.4-14). Harrell timely appealed from the judgment. (R.,
pp.156-58.)
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ISSUES
Harrell states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the state's erroneous assertion that the store sold pipes
violate Mr. Harrell's right to due process?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion in imposing an
excessive sentence?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Harrell failed to show fundamental error entitling him to appellate
review of his unpreserved claim that the state violated his due process
rights at sentencing?

2.

Has Harrell failed to establish that the unified sentence of five years, with
two years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to delivery of a controlled
substance is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Harrell Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Appellate
Review Of His Unpreserved Claim Of A Due Process Violation
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Harrell argues the prosecutor violated his due

process rights by making a "materially untrue assertion" at sentencing.
(Appellant's brief, pp.3-4.)

This Court should decline to review Harrell's due

process argument because he did not raise it below, and he has not even
attempted to carry, much less succeeded in carrying, his appellate burden of
establishing fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho

209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010).

C.

Harrell's Due Process Claim Is Not Properly Before This Court Because
He Did Not Assert A Due Process Violation Below And He Has Failed On
Appeal To Demonstrate Fundamental Error
It is well-settled that "Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not

preserved for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892,
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896, 894 P.2d 125, 129 (1995)). An exception to this rule exists if the alleged
error constitutes fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976.
However, the burden of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the
defendant asserting the error for the first time on appeal.
980.

.!sh at 228,

245 P.3d at

To carry that burden, a defendant asserting an unpreserved error must

demonstrate that the error he alleges "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."

.!sh

Although the Perry opinion applied the fundamental error doctrine in the

context of unpreserved trial errors, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently
clarified that

"ill! claims

of unobjected-to error in criminal cases are now subject

to the fundamental error test set forth in Perry." State v. Carter, 115 Idaho 170,
_ , 307 P.3d 187, 190 (2013) (emphasis added); see also id. at_, 307 P.3d
at 191 (holding "the fundamental error test is the proper standard for determining
whether an appellate court may hear claims based upon unobjected-to error in
all phases of criminal proceedings in the trial courts of this state").
For the first time on appeal, Harrell argues the prosecutor violated his due
process rights by making a "materially untrue" assertion at sentencing.
(Appellant's brief, pp.3-4.) Specifically, he complains:
[A]ccording to the documents attached to the PSI, law enforcement
specifically noted that there were no pipes inside Smoke Effecx.
Accordingly, the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Harrell sold was
[sic] pipes was materially untrue.
Because the prosecutor's
comments were not made until the sentencing hearing and
contradicted the information in the PSI, Mr. Harrell did not have a
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full opportunity to rebut the state's false claim. Further, the state's
untrue assertion harmed Mr. Harrell by undermining his explanation
that he believed the store was operating within the law.
The state's materially untrue assertion that Smoke Effecx
sold pipes violated Mr. Harrell's right to due process. The case
should therefore be remanded for re-sentencing.
(Appellant's brief, p.4 (emphasis in original).) Harrell, however, did not object to
the prosecutor's comments

below and

he certainly never claimed

the

prosecutor's factual misstatement violated his due process rights such that he
was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. (See generally 3/25/13 Tr.) To the
contrary, defense counsel below addressed the alleged misstatement head-on in
his own sentencing argument, advising the court - consistent with the materials
attached to the presentence report - that, to "the best of [his] knowledge, there
weren't any pipes that were sold" at Smoke Effecx. (Compare 3/25/13 Tr., p.20,
Ls.23-25 with

Bates Stamped Attachments to PSI, pp.1, 5, 7.) Having failed

below to assert any due process violation resulting from the prosecutor's
erroneous factual representation, and having failed on appeal to even argue,
much less demonstrate fundamental error, Harrell has forfeited consideration of
this issue on appeal.
Even if this Court were to review Harrell's unpreserved claim of a due
process violation for fundamental error, the claim would fail under all three
prongs of Perry. The first two prongs of Perry require Harrell to demonstrate a
clear violation of one of his unwaived constitutional rights. Perry, 150 Idaho at
228, 245 P.3d at 980. The only constitutional right Harrell claims was violated by
the prosecutor's erroneous assertion that, in addition to "potpourri," Smoke
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Effecx also sold pipes was his due process right to have the sentencing court not
rely upon information that was materially untrue or make materially false
assumptions of fact. (See Appellant's brief, p.3 (citing State v. Gain, 140 Idaho
170, 174, 90 P.3d 920, 924 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 172,
997 P.2d 626, 633 (Ct. App. 2000)). The record does not support Harrell's claim
of a due process violation, however, because there is no indication that the court
actually relied on the prosecutor's erroneous factual statement in imposing
Harrell's sentence and Harrell's defense counsel actually corrected the
misstatement before sentence was imposed.
It is well settled that, to minimize the likelihood of due process violations at
sentencing, the reliability of the information upon which the court relies must be
insured by the defendant's opportunity to present favorable evidence, to examine
all the materials and to explain or rebut adverse evidence. State v. Campbell,
123 Idaho 922, 854 P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1993); Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho
In this case, Harrell not only had the

428, 788 P.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1990).

opportunity to present favorable evidence and to rebut the prosecutor's
erroneous factual statement, his defense counsel actually seized that opportunity
by pointing out to the court that, to "the best of [his] knowledge, there weren't any
pipes that were sold" at Smoke Effecx. (3/25/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.23-25.) Defense
counsel's recollection of the facts was entirely consistent with the facts set forth
in the presentence report and the police reports attached thereto, all of which the
district court indicated it had "carefully reviewed" before imposing Harrell's
sentence. (3/25/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-14; see also p.29, Ls.21-23, p.30, Ls.4-8.)
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Because Harrell had the opportunity to examine the presentence materials and
to rebut and explain the prosecutor's erroneous factual assertion, and because
there is no indication in the record that the court actually relied on the
prosecutor's

erroneous

assertion

in

imposing

sentence,

Harrell

cannot

demonstrate any clear violation of his due process rights.
Harrell's unpreserved claim of a due process violation also fails under the
third prong of Perry, which requires Harrell to demonstrate he was actually
prejudiced by the prosecutor's erroneous factual assertion. Perry, 150 Idaho at
228, 245 P.3d at 980. Harrell argues the misstatement that Smoke Effecx sold
pipes "harmed [him]" because it "undermin[ed] his explanation that he believed
the store was operating within the law." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Harrell's claim of
prejudice fails for the reasons already discussed - i.e., there is no indication in
the record that the court relied on the prosecutor's misstatement in imposing
sentence, defense counsel corrected the misstatement in his own argument, and
defense counsel's recollection of the facts was supported by the presentence
materials, all of which the sentencing court stated it had "carefully reviewed." It
also fails because the presentence materials reviewed by the court contained
multiple other indications that Harrell knew what he was doing - selling synthetic
cannabis labeled as "potpourri" out of a retail store - was illegal.
According to the police reports, the only products Harrell and his wife sold
out of their business were several different brands of "potpourri."

(Bates

Stamped Attachments to PSI, pp.1, 5, 7.) Although there were signs in the store
warning customers not to say words like "weed," "marijuana," "smoke," "pipe,"
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etc., and the "potpourri" was labeled "not 4 human consumption," the business
itself was called Smoke Effecx.

(Id.)

In addition, both the prosecutor and

defense counsel represented there were marijuana-themed "T-shirts and other
things of that nature" present inside the store. (3/25/13 Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.16,
L.2, p.20, Ls.17-20.) When officers executed a search warrant on Smoke Effecx
they recovered "approximately 500 separate packages of different brand names
of potpourri" and nearly $26,000 in cash. (Bates Stamped Attachments to PSI,
p.1.)
Focusing on the information actually contained in the presentence
materials, the district court found Harrell's protestations of ignorance highly
suspect, stating:
The reality is he was selling something in a shop that he knew despite paying lip service to other things, knew that people would
be taking out and smoking to get high. It's not realistic to think that
he was actually selling something that he thought that they would
take home and put in a dish and smell, especially for the prices that
they were obtaining.
(3/25/13 Tr., p.31, Ls.16-24.) Given the wealth of factually accurate information
that tended to show Harrell knew what he was doing was illegal, there is no
reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's erroneous assertion that Smoke
Effecx also sold pipes affected the court's assessment of Harrell's credibility or
that it caused the court to impose a harsher sentence than it otherwise would
have had the misstatement not been made. Harrell's unpreserved claim of a due
process violation thus fails under all three prongs of Perry and is not reviewable
as fundamental error.
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II.
Harrell Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion

A.

Introduction
Harrell challenges the unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed,

imposed upon his conviction for delivering a controlled substance. (Appellant's
brief, pp.4-5.) A review of the record supports the sentence imposed. Harrell
has failed to establish the sentencing court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
sentencing court abused its discretion. !s;l

C.

Harrell Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any
Reasonable View Of The Facts
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577,
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. !s;l
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"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness."
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citation omitted). "When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court
will make an independent examination of the record, "having regard to the nature
of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public
interest."

19.:.

Contrary to Harrell's arguments on appeal, an examination of the

record in this case shows his sentence is reasonable.
Harrell's criminal record occupies nearly eleven full pages of the PSI and
includes eight juvenile adjudications, at least 22 misdemeanor convictions and
one prior felony conviction (for burglary).

(PSI, pp.5-16, 19.) He has served

numerous jail terms, has had the benefit of rehabilitative programming during a
period of retained jurisdiction, and has been afforded multiple opportunities on
probation. (PSI, pp.7-17.) Despite these prior legal sanctions and rehabilitative
efforts, Harrell has demonstrated an unyielding inability or unwillingness to live a
law-abiding life.

He repeatedly violated the terms of his probations by

committing new crimes and, in fact, was on probation for burglary when he
committed the controlled substance charge of which he was convicted in this
case. (PSI, pp.16-17.)
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court specifically
considered the goals of sentencing, including "[f]irst and foremost" the need to
protect society.

(3/25/13 Tr., p.29, Ls.14-21.) The court considered Harrell's

lengthy criminal record and his history of repeated failures to abide by the terms
and conditions of probation. (3/25/13 Tr., p.30, L.8 - p.31, L.10, p.33, L.16 -
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p.34, L.5.) The court also considered Harrell's claim that he did not know the
"potpourri" he sold to the undercover officer in this case was a controlled
substance but specifically found that claim "not credible."

(3/25/13 Tr., p.31,

Ls.11-24, p.32, L.23 - p.33, L.4.) The court was particularly concerned that,
while on felony probation, Harrell was engaged in what, at best, was "clearly a
fringe business on the fringe of legality or illegality, potentially harmful to people,
knowing that he had [addiction] issues himself." (3/25/13 Tr., p.31, L.25 - p.32,
L.22.)

Given the nature of the crime, Harrell's criminal history and his prior

multiple failed attempts at probation, the district court determined that a sentence
of incarceration with a "relatively short fixed [two-year] term" was not only
warranted, but necessary both to "allow[] the board of corrections flexibility in
placing [Harrell] in a rehabilitative program" and to enable Harrell to "obtain the
tools while he's in custody to make better decisions and be a productive member
of the community and society." (3/25/13 Tr., p.36, Ls.4-20.)
On appeal, Harrell does not contest any of the information in the
presentence materials or the district court's factual findings. Instead, he claims
only that the court should have given greater weight to factors he deems
mitigating, including his relatively young age and previously diagnosed learning
disabilities.

(Appellant's brief, pp.1, 4-5.) There can be no question that the

district court, having "carefully reviewed" the contents of the presentence report,
was aware of these "mitigating factors" when it imposed Harrell's sentence. (See
3/25/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-16.) That the court did not assign these factors greater
weight or elevate them above the need to protect society while at the same time
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providing Harrell an opportunity for structured rehabilitation does not show the
sentence is excessive.

Harrell has failed to show an abuse of sentencing

discretion.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
sentence.
th

DATED this 15 day of May 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of May 2014, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
ROBYN FYFFE
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. BOX 2772
BOISE, ID 83701

LAF/pm

13

